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U.S. at 119 (1932». The Supreme 
Court granted the Board's petition 
for certiorari and reversed. 
In the majority opinion written 
by ChiefJustice Rehnquist, the Court 
first considered whether the respon-
dents could contest the 1977 order 
disso 1 ving the desegregation decree. 
The Board argued that the 1977 
finding ofunitariness barred the re-
spondents from challenging the or-
der. Id. at 635. Because the lower 
courts inconsistently used the term 
''unitary,'' confusion arose in inter-
preting the 1977 order. As a result, 
the Court held that when a desegre-
gation decree is to be terminated, all 
parties are "entitled to a rather pre-
cise statement" to that effect from 
the court. Id. at 636. 
In its analysis, the Court focused 
on the standard for dissolving de-
segregation decrees and placed great 
weight on the nature of injunctions 
issued in desegregation cases. In 
distinguishing the nature of the Swift 
injunction on which the court of 
appeals had relied, the Court recog-
nized that "federal supervision of 
local school systems was intended 
as a temporary measure to remedy 
past discrimination." Id. at 637. 
Accordingly, the Court found that 
dissolution standards, which applied 
to other injunctions that were de-
signed to operate in perpetuity, were 
not the proper standards to apply to 
desegregation decrees that were tem-
porary by their very nature. Id. 
The Court held that after local 
authorities had complied with the 
desegregation decree for a "reason-
able period of time," the decree's 
dissolution was proper. Id. In deter-
mining a school district's compli-
ance with desegregation decrees, the 
court first must conclude that the 
school board had "complied in good 
faith with the desegregation decree 
since it was entered." Id. at 638. 
In deciding the question of good 
30 - The Law Forwnl22.1 
faith, "compliance with previous 
court orders is obviously relevant." 
Id. at 637. In this case, the Board 
complied with the decree from 1972 
until 1985. The Court held, there-
fore, that the court of appeals had 
erred in relying on United States v. 
W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629 
(1953), for the proposition that 
"compliance alone cannot become 
the basis for modifying or dissolv-
ing an injunction." Dowell, 111 S. 
Ct. at 637. The Court also recog-
nized that the "grievous wrong" test, 
which the court of appeals gleaned 
from Swift, would place school 
boards under judicial supervision 
indefinitely. Id. at 638. This result 
conflicted with the purpose of schoo 1 
desegregation injunctions, which 
sought only to remedy past segrega-
tion, prevent future discrimination, 
and ultimately return schools to lo-
cal control. Id. 
Next, the Court instructed lower 
courts to determine if the "vestiges 
of past discrimination had been 
eliminated to the extent practicable." 
Id. In evaluating this criteria, the 
Court stated that consideration must 
be given not only to student assign-
ments, but also to "every facet of 
school operations - faculty, staff, 
transportation, extra-curricular ac-
tivities and facilities." Id. (quoting 
Green v. New Kent County School 
Board, 391 U.S. 430,435 (1968». 
On remand, the Court instructed 
the district court to determine (1) if 
the Board had complied in good 
faith with the desegregation decree 
since its imposition and (2) if the 
vestiges of past discrimination had 
been eliminated as far as practicable 
throughout every facet ofthe school 
district's operations. If the district 
court found that the Board was en-
titled to have the injunction lifted, it 
must then proceed to evaluate the 
SRPunderthemandatesoftheEqual 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. [d. 
In dissent, Justice Marshall, 
joined by Justices Blackmun and 
Stevens, sought a stricter standard 
than the majority for ending court 
supervised desegregation. Drawing 
on Brown v. Board of Education, 
347 U.S. 483 (1954), the dissenters 
argued that a decree should not be 
lifted while conditions likely to in-
flict the type of stigma identified in 
Brown still remained. So long as 
"racially identifiable schools" and 
other conditions likely to inflict such 
injury persisted, and while at the 
same timethere were feasible means 
of eliminating them, the dissenters 
would not terminate desegregation 
decrees. Dowell, 111 S. Ct. at 639 
(Marshall, J., dissenting). 
The decision in Board of Educa-
tion of Oklahoma City v. Dowell set 
down standards for dissolution of 
desegregation decrees, thus making 
it easier for school districts cur-
rently under supervision to be set on 
their own again. Under the new 
standards, a school system that was 
at one time segregated and subject 
to a desegregation order may have 
that order terminated upon a show-
ing that it has complied with the 
order in good faith for a "reasonable 
period oftime," has abandoned any 
discriminatory practices to the ex-
tent "practicable," and that it is un-
likely that the school system would 
again resort to discriminatory prac-
tices. 
- Robert D. Cole Jr. 
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural 
Telephone Service Co.: ALPHA-
BETIZED DIRECTORY 
LISTINGS CONSISTING OF 
SURNAMES AND TELE-
PHONE NUMBERS ARE NOT 
SUBJECT TO COPYRIGHT 
PROTECTION. 
In Feist Publications, Inc. v. Ru-
ral Telephone Service Co., 111 S. 
0.1282(1991), the Supreme Court 
of the United States held that a tele-
phone directory listing subscribers 
alphabetically by surname was not 
sufficiently original to be afforded 
copyright protection. The Court 
classified the directories as compi-
lations of factual raw data, but held 
that the directories were not "se-
lected, coordinated, or arranged" as 
necessary to constitute a valid 
copyrightable compilation. 
Feist Publications, Inc. (Feist), 
was a publishing company of large 
directories covering eleven tele-
phone service areas. Rural Tele-
phone Service Company, Inc. (Ru-
ral), was a certified public telephone 
service who, pursuant to state regu-
lation, produced a telephone direc-
tory for its telephone service sub-
scribers. As both Feist and Rural 
profited from the sale of yellow 
page advertisements, the two direc-
tories were in direct competition 
with one another. 
Feist attempted to obtain a li-
cense from Rural to use Rural's 
white page listings. Although Rural 
refused to issue the license, Feist 
nevertheless used the listings for its 
directory. Although F eistperformed 
some independant verification and 
specifically used street addresses 
with its listings, 1,309 of the 46,878 
listings in Feist's directory were 
identical to those in Rural's. Of 
those identical listings, four were 
fictitious names and numbers which 
Rural had intentionally placed in its 
directory to detect copying. 
The District Court for the Dis-
trict of Kansas held that Rural's 
directories were copyrightable com-
pilations and that Feist had infringed 
on Rural's valid copyright. The 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
cuit affirmed. Certiorari was granted 
by the United States Supreme Court 
to determine whether the alphabet-
ized directory consisting of sur-
names and telephone numbers was 
copyrightable. 
The Court began its analysis by 
stating that "[t ]he most fundamental 
axiom of copyright law," is that, 
facts and ideas are not copyrightable. 
Id. at 1287 (citing Harper & Row, 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter-
prises, 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985». 
The Court noted that the Constitu-
tionmandatesoriginality, which has 
been developed to mean that ''the 
work was independently created by 
the author (as opposed to copied 
from other works), and that it pos-
sesses at least some minimal degree 
of creativity." Id. (citing 1 M. 
Nimmer & D. Nimmer, Copyright 
§§ 2.01[A], [B] (1990) (hereinafter 
Nimmer». The Court explained 
that originality does not require nov-
elty, but only a slight amount of 
creativity. [d. (citing Nimmer, § 
1.08[C][1]). Moreover, the Court 
noted that two identical works that 
were created independently may 
both be the subject ofa valid copy-
right. [d. at 1287-88 (citing Sheldon 
v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 
81 F.2d 49,54 (2nd Cir. 1936». 
The Court went on to explain 
that facts were not subject to copy-
right because facts were not original 
and were not attributable to an act of 
authorship. "The distinction is one 
between creation and discovery: the 
first person to find and report a 
particular fact has not created the 
fact; he or she has merely discov-
ered its existence." [d. at 1288. 
Facts, therefore, remain in the pub-
lic domain. 
Although facts are not 
copyrightable, factual compilations 
may be the subject of copyright. 
However, only those elements of 
the compilation which are original 
to the author will be protected. A 
telephone directory is considered 
by the Court to be a compilation. [d. 
Identical facts may be used without 
infringment so long as the facts are 
not "selected, coordinated and ar-
ranged" identically. [d. at 1289. 
The Court noted that a number of 
lower court decisions mistakingly 
permitted copyright protection for 
"sweat of the brow," which was the 
courts' way of rewarding hard work 
of an author. [d. at 1291. The most 
blatant flaw with this type of doc-
trine, the Court explained, was that 
it extended copyright protection to 
the underlying facts of a compila-
tion, preventing subsequent authors 
of compilations from using already 
acquired factual information. They 
instead had to arrive at the same 
result through their own hard work 
and independant creation. [d. (cit-
ing Jeweler's Circular Publishing 
Co. v. Keystone Publishing Co., 281 
F. 83 (2nd Cir. 1922». 
The object of copyright law, the 
Court noted, was to ''promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts," 
not to reward the labor of authors. 
[d. at 1290 (quoting U.S. Const. art. 
I, §8, cl. 8). One reason for not 
permitting facts to retain copyright 
protection, the Court explained, is 
the need to "disseminate factual 
works." [d. at 1292 (quoting Ha1per 
& Row, 471 U.S. at 563). 
Compilation was defined by stat-
ute as "a work formed by the collec-
tion and assembly of pre-existing 
materials or of data that are selected, 
coordinated, or arranged in such a 
way that the resulting work as a 
whole constitutes an original work 
of authorship." Id at 1293 (quoting 
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976». The Court 
explained that the purpose of statu-
tory language was to emphasize that 
compilations are not copyrightable 
per se. The Court noted: 
[the] statute identifies three 
distinct elements and re-
quires each to be met for a 
work to qualify as a 
copyrightable compilation: 
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(1) the collection and as-
sembly of pre-existing ma-
terial, facts, or data; (2) the 
selection, coordination, and 
arrangement of those mate-
rials; and (3) the creation, 
by virtue of the particular 
selection, coordination, or 
arrangement, of an "origi-
nal" work of authorship. Id. 
The Court noted that the first and 
third elements were self-explana-
tory. The key issue was found in the 
second element: "whether the selec-
tion, coordination, and arrangement 
are sufficiently original to merit pro-
tection." Id. at 1294. The Court 
noted that the language, "in such a 
way," suggested that some compi-
lations would be copyrightable while 
others would not. Id. Relying on 
precedent, the Court justified that 
every clause and word of a statute 
should be given effect. Id. (citing 
Moskal v. United States, 111 S. Ct. 
1032 (1991». 
The Court held that alphabetiz-
ing surnames for white pages did 
not satisfy the minimum constitu-
tional standards for copyright pro-
tection and was "devoid of even the 
slightest trace of creativity." Id. at 
1296. The selection of surnames, 
the Court found, was obvious and 
"lacks the modicum of creativity 
necessary to transform mere selec-
tion into copyrightable expression." 
Id. Moreover, Rural did not "se-
lect" to publish the surnames in its 
directory, but was required by state 
statute to publish the names and 
telephone numbers of its subscrib-
ers. !d. at 1296-97. Lastly, the 
Court noted that alphabetizing by 
surname was "an age-old practice, 
firmly rooted in tradition and so 
commonplace that it has come to be 
expected as a matter of course." Id. 
at 1297. 
The Supreme Court's holding in 
Feist allows publishers of white page 
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listings to pilfer from theircompeti-
tors simply because the surnames 
were alphabetized, thereby lacking 
originality. Although Feist and 
Rural made their profit exclusively 
from yellow page advertisements, 
many other directories exist where 
the publishers profit solely from the 
directories themselves. Knowing 
that a rival may simply reproduce 
and profit from one's compilation 
may result in publishers engaging in 
other forms of publication which 
are less vulnerable to piracy by com-
petitors. 
- Kimberly A. Doyle 
Harmelin v. Michigan: MAN-
DATORY SENTENCE OF 
LIFE WITHOUT PAROLE 
DOES NOT VIOLATE 
EIGHTH AMENDMENT. 
In the plurality opinion of 
Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 
2680 (1991), the United States Su-
preme Court held that a mandatory 
sentence of life in prison withoutthe 
possibility of parole did not violate 
the Eighth Amendment's proscrip-
tion against cruel and unusual pun-
ishment. In its analysis, the Court 
reviewed the history of the Eighth 
Amendment in order to determine 
whether a mandatory sentence could 
be imposed without considering 
mitigating factors. The Court re-
fused to extend the so-called "indi-
vidualized capital-sentencing doc-
trine" to cases other than those im-
posing the death penalty. 
Ronald Harmelin was convicted 
of possessing 672 grams of cocaine. 
Although Harmelin had no prior 
convictions, he received a manda-
tory sentence of life in prison with-
out the possibility of parole pursu-
ant to Michigan law. The Michigan 
Court of Appeals reversed 
Harmelin's conviction on the 
grounds that evidence in support of 
the conviction was obtained in vio-
lation of Michigan's Constitution. 
On petition for rehearing, however, 
the court of appeals vacated its re-
versal and affirmed HarmeIin's sen-
tence. The Michigan Supreme Court 
denied leave to appeal, and the 
United States Supreme Court granted 
certiorari. 
Harmelin set forth two reasons 
that his sentence was unconstitu-
tional as a violation of the Eighth 
Amendment's prohibition against 
cruel and unusual punishment. First, 
Harmelin contended that the sen-
tence was unconstitutional because 
the punishment was significantly 
disproportionate to the crime com-
mitted. Id. Second, Harmelin ar-
gued that the sentence violated the 
Eighth Amendment because it was 
mandatory, and therefore, precluded 
the trial judge from considering any 
particular circumstance of the crime 
and the criminal. Specifically, 
Harmelin contended that it was cruel 
and unusual to impose such a se-
vere, mandatory sentence as life 
imprisonment without considering 
mitigating factors. 
To begin its analysis, a plurality 
of the court held that "[ s levere, man-
datory penalties may be cruel, but 
they are not unusual in the constitu-
tional sense .... " The Court noted 
that our nation's history has long 
provided examples of mandatory 
penalties, including death sentences. 
Id. The Court reasoned, therefore, 
that a sentence which was not other-
wise cruel and unusual did not be-
come such simply because it was 
mandatory. Id. 
The Court then considered 
whether the Eighth Amendment re-
quired an individualized sentencing 
determination that the punishment 
imposed be appropriate to the crime 
committed. Id. The Court noted 
that such an individualized sentenc-
ing determination was, in fact, ap-
plicable in capital cases, and impo-
sition of the death penalty without 
